This thesis proposes a theoretical framework able to account for the transition from an international system to a domestic one. It relies on empirical studies from the history of European integration. Its model is based on two principal factors: the offense-defense balance and the degree of interdependence among actor When offense has the advantage, incentives drive the actors to solve their interdependence problems by usin violence because it is quite effective. It is only when defense has the advantage that interdependence can lead to integration. However, that latter condition is not sufficient. When interdependence is weak, actors see to limit it, to preserve their independence. It is only when defense has the advantage and interdependence is overwhelming and unavoidable, that integration becomes a viable solution. This model was applied to explain the transition from a traditional independence-preserving strategy to a delegation-of-powers policy in favor of supranational institutions, by examining three categories of actors: governments, members of parliaments an judges. The origins of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the failure of the European Defense Corn munit y (1954) were used to investigate governmental integration. The first reinforcements of the European Parliament conceming budgetary (1970) and legislative matters (1986) served to study parliamentary integration. lastly, the analysis of judicial integration was explored through the evolution of German and French national courts towards the aeee tance of the su remac of Communit law.
