The objective of this thesis is to analyze public debt management in order to show that, based on optimality criteria, public debt could be a more judicial financing choice in comparison with taxation or seigniorage. A comparative study between these three financing strategies is conducted by taking into consideration their respective institutional feasability and by revisiting the concept of optimality from a financial viewpoint, i.e. regarding the potential impacts on public finance soundness, and from an economic aspect, i.e. regarding the potential impacts on the economic performance of the country. The non optimality of taxation and seigniorage could be a motive for the Governement to finance public deficit by indebtedness. However, it must be highlighted that public debt must also comply with optimality criteria, otherwise it will be considered inefficient. Subsequently, it is shown that Government must aim at public debt sustainability in order to ensure its optimality. In other words, Governement must avoid public debt to follow an explosive path, which is likely to lead to its non optimality. Finally, the role of financial risks in public debt management is put forth in order to suggest that non optimal or non sustainable public debt is partly due to failing financial risk management. The case study is conducted in the member countries of the Indian Ocean Commission.