Price, competition and regulation : Support to innovation and hospital drug prices in France

Health policies aim to improve the well being of individuals. Politic stakeholders encourage a dynamic policy of pharmaceutical innovation in order to allow patient access to treatments for which the benefit/risk ratio is positive. Meanwhile, spending efficiency should be controlled because of the limited resources collectively funded. We sought to provide insights of the effects of policies aimed to support innovation on hospital drug prices in France (freely set), in the context of a changing market with the rapid adoption of expensive biotechnology treatments. Through the study of three policies ofregulation (expensive drugs funded in addition to the DRG payment system, temporary use authorizations and orphan drugs), we showed the significant contribution of innovation to the growth of spending. The search for productive efficiency, which is necessary to avoid the waste of resources, must be accompanied by debates on the willingness to pay for innovative medicines.

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Source https://theses.hal.science/tel-00944739
Author Degrassat-Théas, Albane, Degrassat
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated May 6, 2026, 21:48 (UTC)
Created May 6, 2026, 21:48 (UTC)
Identifier NNT: 2013PA090027
Language fr
Rights https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé (Legos) ; Université Paris Dauphine-PSL ; Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)
creator Degrassat-Théas, Albane, Degrassat
date 2013-09-30T00:00:00
harvest_object_id 04fce55e-6eb0-4e9e-8425-c8abbfeb40a7
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2026-03-31T00:00:00
set_spec type:THESE