This thesis scrutinises the genesis of Derrida’s notion of faith as the ‘possibility of the impossible’. A milestone of his later philosophy and embodied in many concrete examples as ‘pardon’, ‘giving’, ‘promise’, or “witness”, this notion originates in some problems that inspired him from the beginning of his career. ‘Faith’ is not identical to ‘religion’—although it appears to be one of its sources—, but is rather supposed to designate exceeding the limits of any possible knowledge. To follow the different stages of the formation of the concept, this research focuses on Derrida’s reading of Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas. Derrida challenges the fundamental distinctions introduced by these authors: Husserl’s distinction between reality and ideality; Heidegger's distinction between being (das Seiende) and Being (das Sein); and, finally, Levinas’ distinction between Being and Beyond of Being. Trying to follow these distinctions strictly, Derrida discovers points where these distinctions appear to be impossible. Thus, according to Derrida, the very impossibility of these distinctions should compel these philosophers to make their decisions in the midst of undecidability. The faith in question is these beliefs in their philosophical distinctions that exceed any epistemological arguments. The main purpose of this retrospective research is, therefore, to show that the notion of the faith as the ‘possibility of the impossible’ is an inherent consequence of deconstruction, formulated as an experience of the impossible.
