Financial markets are traditionally seen as places where demand for financing meets capacity. However, financial intermediaries have contributed to the growing complexity of transactions and to an emerging relational network within markets. The purpose of this PhD dissertation is to consider the Eurobond market as an organization in which members adopt rationalities along with diversified and evolving courses of action. We used a methodology based on historical events and on a long-run analysis of practices. Following an abductive approach, observations set out of this double perspective are confronted with conceptual frames based on organizational theories. This confrontation is led within three steps. First of all, the evolution and the practices are studied to show why and how the Eurobond market behaves as an organization and not only as a place devoted to transactions. Then, the organizational shapes that it adopts all along its history are identified. To finish with, as the “firm” seems to be its most recent morphology, it is necessary to examine its main coordination pattern. Actually, the Eurobond market appears to be a professional bureaucracy. As a matter of fact, predominating risks onto this place are not “market risks” any more. They mostly derive from typical organizational stakes: the behavioral control of members and management of changes.These research results should contribute to renew points of view on financial markets, since they tend to line up with what used to make the Eurobond market so unique. They may be a source of interest for the regulators who, from now one, face a limited ability to control financial intermediaries. These conclusions may also help borrowers to understand that, de facto, they presently deal more with a fund supplier than they finance onto a market.
