Security analysis of smart card C code using simulated physical attacks

This thesis focuses on the effects of attacks by physical faults on embedded source code specifically for smart cards. Such attacks can compromise the security of the system by providing access to confidential information, compromising the integrity of sensitive data or disrupting the execution flow. In this thesis, we describe security properties to express security guarantees on the system. We also offer an attack model defining at high level an attacker’s ability to disrupt the system. With these properties and model, we check the source code security against physical attacks. We use static analysis and dynamic testing, combined with attack injection to simulate the consequences of physical faults at software level. Two techniques are created to stress the functional behavior of the code under attack, test the reliability of built-in security countermeasures and identify new threats. These techniques were implemented in a framework to help developers secure their source code in an industrial environment.

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Source https://theses.hal.science/tel-00771273
Author Kauffmann-Tourkestansky, Xavier
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated May 11, 2026, 12:26 (UTC)
Created May 11, 2026, 12:26 (UTC)
Identifier NNT: 2012ORLE2044
Language fr
Rights https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale d'Orléans (LIFO) ; Université d'Orléans (UO)-Ecole Nationale Supérieure d'Ingénieurs de Bourges
creator Kauffmann-Tourkestansky, Xavier
date 2012-11-28T00:00:00
harvest_object_id b8943c9b-90ec-49be-88ba-b7da33c6d2a5
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2026-03-31T00:00:00
set_spec type:THESE