In this dissertation, the reliability of environmental provisions is assessed through a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods to ensure a triangulation of the results. Firstly, the study of their disclosure by the French listed companies reveals its insufficiency and its degradation over the period of 2005-2010. Secondly, both compliance tests to Benford's law and multiple regression analyses do not undermine the reliability of environmental provisions disclosed by the same sample of French listed companies. These results contrast with previous research validating the use of discretionary environmental provisions to smooth earnings and to limit the emergence of political costs. Thirdly, the multiple case study conducted through semi-structured interviews with actors of these groups explains the reliability of environmental provisions by the one from their assessment process and the important institutional pressure that surrounds it. Therefore, the results of this dissertation suggest that some accounting choices that can discretionary affect earnings are better explained by institutional pressure than by the willingness of managers to improve their personal situations.
