The scope and limits of Chomsky's naturalism

While Chomsky subscribes to methodological naturalism, he rejects both metaphysical naturalism and an externalist conception of meaning. This chapter explores some of Chomsky's grounds for rejecting both metaphysical naturalism and meaning externalism, in particular his peculiar attitude towards ontological physicalism and his arguments for an internalist approach to meaning.

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Field Value
Source Chomsky's Notebook
Author Jacob, Pierre
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated October 29, 2026, 13:11 (UTC)
Created October 29, 2026, 13:11 (UTC)
Identifier ijn_00755897
Language en
Rights https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor Institut Jean-Nicod (IJN) ; Département d'Etudes Cognitives - ENS-PSL (DEC) ; École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL) ; Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL) ; Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Collège de France (CdF (institution))-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Département de Philosophie - ENS-PSL ; École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL) ; Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)
creator Jacob, Pierre
date 2010-10-29T00:00:00
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metadata_modified 2025-11-04T00:00:00
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