This paper argues that transitional justice discourse and practice suffer from a limited conception of memory which reduces the latter to the sphere of the mind and neglects its attachment to the bodily aspects of human existence. This misconception is not unique to the field of TJ thinking but common in memory research; ultimately it goes back to the conceptual dichotomy between body and mind which was introduced by Platonic thinking and is haunting Western thought since then. Contrary to the assertions of this tradition, memory is not "located" in mind, but always incorporated. Drawing on Henri Bergson, the German philosopher and physician Thomas Fuchs distinguishes between implicit and explicit memory. While the latter refers to memory in its common conception as chronologically ordered conscious representations of the past, the former refers to structures of habituation created by past experiences which have inscribed themselves into the structures of the body. Drawing on phenomenological theories, the paper discusses the implications of implicit memory on transitional justice processes.
