Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game

In a global game, larger ambiguity is shown to decrease the amount of coordination each player perceives. Consequently, small uncertainty tends to select the Pareto dominated equilibrium of the game without uncertainty. Implications for models of financial crises are drawn.

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Field Value
Source ISSN: 0165-1765
Author Laskar, Daniel
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated May 7, 2026, 15:29 (UTC)
Created May 7, 2026, 15:29 (UTC)
Identifier halshs-00924130
Language fr
contributor Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE) ; École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL) ; Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
creator Laskar, Daniel
date 2014-02-07T00:00:00
harvest_object_id 76afaf1a-466b-4339-b61b-9619a6e0dbee
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2026-02-27T00:00:00
relation info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.018
set_spec type:ART