Corporate social responsibility induces the production of many instruments whose legal status is not clearly established. The objectives of this contribution are to determine whether they belong to the legal field and, if this is the case, to measure their normative intensity as far as labour law is concerned. This notion of normative intensity, very close indeed to the normative force, is nevertheless more precise because it implies a sort a variability, a gradation, whereas the notion of normative force appears to be more "static". We understand the normative force to mean the capacity of a norm to induce behaviours, to guide practices or to have an influence on conducts and / or to be a standard or a model to assess these behaviours, conducts or practices. Yet if some of these instruments are nothing more than a revelation of soft law because they are only declarations or proclamations of already applicable pre-existing rules, others, on the other hands, will be seen as real unilateral legal acts of the employer or as professional norms. Under these conditions, they ca, in some cases, have a binding or imperative force. The analysis shows also that the normative intensity of these instruments varies depending on whether the author or the subject of the norm is concerned. The intensity of the normative force of instruments of corporate social responsibility seems, in the end, to be doubly variables : firstly according to the content of the norms and secondly according to the subject of the norms.
