Stricter employment protection and firms' incentives to train: The case of French older workers

From French data, this paper uses a difference-in-differences approach combined with propensity score matching to identify the effect of an exogenous change in employment protection among older workers on firm's incentives to provide training. Laying off workers aged 50 and above, French firms have to pay a tax to the unemployment insurance system, known as the Delalande tax. In 1999, the measure was subjected to a reform that increased due taxes but that did not concern equally all firms. We find that this exogenous shock to employment protection for older workers substantially rises firms' incentives to train the 45-49 age group of workers. This result confirms predictions of the simple labor market model we develop in a first stage.

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Source https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00856132
Author Messe, Pierre-Jean, Rouland, Bénédicte
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated May 9, 2026, 23:02 (UTC)
Created May 9, 2026, 23:02 (UTC)
Identifier halshs-00856132
Language en
Rights https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques (TEPP) ; Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée (UPEM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
creator Messe, Pierre-Jean
date 2012-07-08T00:00:00
harvest_object_id d377b1fb-ab11-4804-9b6b-6acb01b4b76b
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2024-08-27T00:00:00
set_spec type:UNDEFINED