A Further Note on the Stable Matching Problem

Using a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is shown that the core of the matching game is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is derived.

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Source ISSN: 0166-218X
Author Demange, Gabrielle, Gale, David, Sotomayor, Marilda
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated May 28, 2026, 09:32 (UTC)
Created May 28, 2026, 09:32 (UTC)
Identifier halshs-00670980
Language en
contributor Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique (CECO) ; École polytechnique (X) ; Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
creator Demange, Gabrielle
date 1987-03-28T00:00:00
harvest_object_id 34a01342-76ad-4ab1-a63c-865191af091b
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2026-01-21T00:00:00
set_spec type:ART