Sustainable Oligopolies

In this paper, we show that an oligopoly market where both increasing returns to scale and competition are present can nevertheless satisfy stability conditions. In a sustainable oligopoly (1) each consumer chooses the firm which proposes the price-quality schedule he prefers (2) firms earn non-negative profits (3) no new firm could attract consumers and make profits. We prove that such a sustainable oligopoly exists under rather weak assumptions. The results apply to most models of vertical or horizontal product differentiation or to models of quality differentiation due to congestion effects.

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Source ISSN: 0022-0531
Author Demange, Gabrielle, Henriet, Dominique
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated May 28, 2026, 09:30 (UTC)
Created May 28, 2026, 09:30 (UTC)
Identifier halshs-00670928
Language en
contributor Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique (CECO) ; École polytechnique (X) ; Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
creator Demange, Gabrielle
date 1991-08-28T00:00:00
harvest_object_id 7fa55282-af1e-4cab-aea9-9aba2edf9409
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2026-02-07T00:00:00
set_spec type:ART