Remarks on existence and uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria in the non-potential case

This article is devoted to various methods (optimal transport, fixed-point, ordinary differential equations) to obtain existence and/or uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria for games with a continuum of players with both attractive and repulsive effects. We mainly address separable situations but for which the game does not have a potential. We also present several numerical simulations which illustrate the applicability of our approach to compute Cournot-Nash equilibria.

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Source https://hal.science/hal-00987753
Author Blanchet, Adrien, Carlier, Guillaume
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated May 5, 2026, 12:01 (UTC)
Created May 5, 2026, 12:01 (UTC)
Identifier hal-00987753
Language en
Rights https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative (GREMAQ) ; Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole) ; Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
creator Blanchet, Adrien
date 2014-05-02T00:00:00
harvest_object_id e036e502-5a7c-4afc-b1b4-f7ad14655ad2
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2026-02-07T00:00:00
relation info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/arxiv/1405.1354
set_spec type:UNDEFINED