According to the standard economic approach, the level of redistribution in a democratic society is growing with the inequality of the income distribution. However, data do not support such a finding. In this article, we assert that the canonical model fails Örst in its basic assumption, the fundamental selÖsh nature of human beings. Following Adam Smith as well as modern cognitive sciences, we then suppose that a moral instinct coexists with a selfish one. It follows that democracy, based on a unanimous agreement and not on a majority of voters as in the standard approach, can be characterized by two different cultures. In the Örst one, in the spirit of Locke, individual property comes before the government. In such a culture, we show that a growing di§erence between median and mean incomes is not necessarily associated with a higher redistribution. In the second culture, in the spirit of Rousseau, the general will comes before particular interests. As a result, we Önd that in such a culture an increase of the top incomes can quite paradoxically reduce redistribution.
