Layoff Costs and Efficiency with Asymmetric Information

Wage determination under asymmetric information generates ine¢ ciencies due to excess turnover. Severance pay and layo¤ taxes can improve e¢ ciency. We show that inefficient separations can even be fully removed with xed separation taxes in the case where therelevant private information is exponentially distributed.

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Field	Value
Source	https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-00972915
Author	Delacroix, Alain, Wasmer, Etienne
Maintainer	CCSD
Last Updated	May 5, 2026, 16:59 (UTC)
Created	May 5, 2026, 16:59 (UTC)
Identifier	hal-00972915
Language	en
Rights	https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor	Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi [Montréal] (CIRPEE) ; Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal (UQAM)
creator	Delacroix, Alain
date	2009-09-04T00:00:00
harvest_object_id	d1b7c449-44a7-4f70-8e49-de9fe2e21001
harvest_source_id	3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title	test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified	2024-07-12T00:00:00
relation	info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/5l6uh8ogmqildh09h4823espg
set_spec	type:UNDEFINED