Nash equilibria with partial monitoring; Computation and Lemke-Howson algorithm

In two player bi-matrix games with partial monitoring, actions played are not observed, only some messages are received. Those games satisfy a crucial property of usual bi-matrix games: there are only a finite number of required (mixed) best replies. This is very helpful while investigating sets of Nash equilibria: for instance, in some cases, it allows to relate it to the set of equilibria of some auxiliary game with full monitoring. In the general case, the Lemke-Howson algorithm is extended and, under some genericity assumption, its output are Nash equilibria of the original game. As a by product, we obtain an oddness property on their number.

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Source https://hal.science/hal-00773217
Author Perchet, Vianney
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated May 15, 2026, 09:32 (UTC)
Created May 15, 2026, 09:32 (UTC)
Identifier hal-00773217
Language en
Rights https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor Laboratoire de Probabilités et Modèles Aléatoires (LPMA) ; Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 (UPMC)-Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 (UPD7)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
creator Perchet, Vianney
date 2013-01-12T00:00:00
harvest_object_id 720a5ca4-0eaf-49f2-a15b-9af5aa593294
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2025-09-29T00:00:00
relation info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/arxiv/1301.2662
set_spec type:UNDEFINED