Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware

We show how to exploit the encrypted key import functions of a variety of different cryptographic devices to reveal the imported key. The attacks are padding oracle attacks, where error messages resulting from incorrectly padded plaintexts are used as a side channel. In the asymmetric encryption case, we modify and improve Bleichenbacher's attack on RSA PKCS#1v1.5 padding, giving new cryptanalysis that allows us to carry out the 'million message attack' in a mean of 49 000 and median of 14 500 oracle calls in the case of cracking an unknown valid ciphertext under a 1024 bit key (the original algorithm takes a mean of 215 000 and a median of 163 000 in the same case). We show how implementation details of certain devices admit an attack that requires only 9 400 operations on average (3 800 median). For the symmetric case, we adapt Vaudenay's CBC attack, which is already highly efficient. We demonstrate the vulnerabilities on a number of commercially available cryptographic devices, including security tokens, smartcards, Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) and the Estonian electronic ID card. The attacks are efficient enough to be practical: we give timing details for all the devices found to be vulnerable, showing how our optimisations make a qualitative difference to the practicality of the attack. We give mathematical analysis of the effectiveness of the attacks, extensive empirical results, and a discussion of countermeasures and manufacturer reaction.

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Source https://inria.hal.science/hal-00691958
Author Bardou, Romain, Focardi, Riccardo, Kawamoto, Yusuke, Simionato, Lorenzo, Steel, Graham, Tsay, Joe-Kai
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated November 4, 2026, 14:12 (UTC)
Created November 4, 2026, 14:12 (UTC)
Identifier Report N°: RR-7944
Language en
Rights https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor Security of information systems (SECSI) ; Laboratoire Spécification et Vérification [Cachan] (LSV) ; École normale supérieure - Cachan (ENS Cachan)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École normale supérieure - Cachan (ENS Cachan)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centre Inria de Saclay ; Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)
creator Bardou, Romain
date 2012-04-27T00:00:00
harvest_object_id de8c68c0-a118-4425-8da7-4f8fb37ad3b1
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2026-08-07T00:00:00
set_spec type:REPORT