Inefficiencies in the sale of ideas: theory and empirics

The sale of ideas (e.g. through licensing) facilitates vertical specialization and the division of labor between research and development. This specialization can improve the overall efficiency of the innovative process. However, these gains depend on the timing of the sale: the buyer of an idea should assume development at the stage at which he has an efficiency advantage. We show that in an environment with asymmetric information about the value of the idea and where this asymmetry decreases as the product is developed, the seller of the idea may delay the sale to the more efficient firm, thus incurring higher development costs. We obtain a condition for the equilibrium timing of the sale and examine how factors such as the intensity of competition between potential buyers influence it. Empirical analysis of licensing contracts signed between firms in the pharmaceutical industry supports our theoretical predictions.

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Source https://hal.science/hal-00639128
Author Allain, Marie-Laure, Henry, Emeric, Kyle, Margaret
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated November 11, 2026, 13:59 (UTC)
Created November 11, 2026, 13:59 (UTC)
Identifier hal-00639128
Language en
Rights https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO) ; École polytechnique (X) ; Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)
creator Allain, Marie-Laure
date 2011-11-08T00:00:00
harvest_object_id 395660d4-f9ce-487e-9a7c-4aeb7aa80310
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2025-09-23T00:00:00
set_spec type:UNDEFINED