Les crashs sont rationnels

As we show by using notions of equilibrium in infinite sequential games, crashes or financial escalations are rational for economic or environmental agents, who have a vision of an infinite world. This contradicts a picture of a self-regulating, wise and pacific economic world. In other words, in this context, equilibrium is not synonymous of stability. We try to draw, from this statement, methodological consequences and new ways of thinking, especially in economic game theory. Among those new paths, coinduction is the basis of our reasoning in infinite games.

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Field Value
Source https://ens-lyon.hal.science/ensl-00646546
Author Lescanne, Pierre
Maintainer CCSD
Last Updated May 20, 2026, 17:39 (UTC)
Created May 20, 2026, 17:39 (UTC)
Identifier ensl-00646546
Language fr
Rights https://about.hal.science/hal-authorisation-v1/
contributor Laboratoire de l'Informatique du Parallélisme (LIP) ; École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon) ; Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL) ; Université de Lyon-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
creator Lescanne, Pierre
date 2011-11-07T00:00:00
harvest_object_id 6f2e04c8-d6d5-47c1-b1a6-fdf950370715
harvest_source_id 3374d638-d20b-4672-ba96-a23232d55657
harvest_source_title test moissonnage SELUNE
metadata_modified 2025-10-13T00:00:00
relation info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/arxiv/1111.7299
set_spec type:UNDEFINED