Efficiency and acceptability in the regulation of non-point source pollution : experiments on cooperative ambient-based instruments.
type: Dataset
description: The purpose of this thesis was to test in laboratory the efficiency of two variants of the ambient tax (Average Pigovian Tax and Capped Ambient Tax) that present the advantage of reducing the financial burden imposed through taxation but whose efficiency requires that polluters coordinate their efforts. To enable this coordination, three types of communication (“cheap talk” or costless communication, exogenous costly communication and endogenous costly communication) are tested.The results show that the sucker’s payoff and the size of the groups are crucial in the potential of cheap talk to induce cooperation. When the communication is costly and exogenous, cooperation is limited in time. However when the decision to communicate for a price is up to the players, they decide not to communicate. We’ve also shown that cheap talk facilitates coordination towards the Pareto-dominant equilibrium and makes the Capped Ambient Tax efficient.
identifier: NNT: 2013STRAB002
issued: 2026-05-06T04:05:43.430124
language: fr
modified: 2026-05-06T04:05:43.430129
contact point: Organization
  fn: CCSD
keyword: acceptabilite-sociale
keyword: ambient-tax
keyword: communication
keyword: coordination
keyword: dilemme-social
keyword: infoeu-reposemanticsdoctoralthesis
keyword: non-point-source-pollution
keyword: pollution-diffuse
keyword: shsecohumanities-and-social-scienceseconomics-and-finance
keyword: social-acceptability
keyword: social-dilemma
keyword: taxe-ambiante
keyword: theses
landing page: https://theses.hal.science/tel-00954736

Efficiency and acceptability in the regulation of non-point source pollution : experiments on cooperative ambient-based instruments.
type: Distribution
format: HTML
issued: 2026-05-06T04:05:43.458606
modified: 2026-05-06T04:05:43.397727
access URL: https://theses.hal.science/tel-00954736

test_moissonnage_selune
type: Agent