Quantitative and experimental study of investment incentive mechanisms in electricity markets: A short run and long run analysis of actors’ strategies
type: Distribution
access URL: https://theses.hal.science/tel-00942300
format: HTML
issued: 2026-05-07T02:48:19.092574
modified: 2026-05-07T02:48:19.076079

test_moissonnage_selune
type: Agent

Quantitative and experimental study of investment incentive mechanisms in electricity markets: A short run and long run analysis of actors’ strategies
type: Dataset
contact point: Organization
  fn: CCSD
keyword: reliability
keyword: experimental-economics
keyword: programmation-dynamique
keyword: optimization
keyword: theses
keyword: shsecohumanities-and-social-scienceseconomics-and-finance
keyword: electricity
keyword: economie-experimentale
keyword: electricite
keyword: dynamic-programming
keyword: theorie-des-jeux
keyword: infoeu-reposemanticsdoctoralthesis
keyword: fiabilite
keyword: game-theory
keyword: optimisation
landing page: https://theses.hal.science/tel-00942300
description: In this thesis, we deal with the question of reliability of electricity system and particularly the problem of generation capacity adequacy in electricity markets, characterized by uncertain and volatile demand. This question is currently the object of many politics and economics debates in the European Commission of energy. It occurs within the context of deregulations and reforms of liberalization operated in western countries. This deregulation was caused many shortages and crisis in many electricity markets in the world. Failures are caused by several factors such as, the presence of uncertainties on future demand and fuel prices, the risk-averse behavior of investors and the market power exercised by existing generators. They had lead to high spot market prices and a fundamental imbalance between the steadily growing demand for power and the limited increases, due to the lack of investments, in generation capacities. Many mechanisms, additional to the energy market, that ensure an adequate incentive for investments and a stable and socially acceptable electricity prices have been proposed. In this work, we compare different investment incentive mechanisms, in terms of long-term capacity adequacy in an uncertain environment, cost effectiveness and the ability of reducing market power. In the literature, the problem of long- term system reliability has been largely studied in qualitative terms. A few works attempt to model the quantitative effects of those market designs. The contribution of this work is to propose a quantitative analysis based on dynamics models. Competition is considered by using the principles of game theory. Stochastic dynamic programming is used to deal with the stochastic environment of the market and mixed complementarity problem and variational inequality formulations are employed to find Nash equilibrium. In addition to the analytic analysis, an experimental study is carried out in order to include a larger diversity of strategy. The mai…
issued: 2026-05-07T02:48:19.090863
language: fr
modified: 2026-05-07T02:48:19.090868