Shared body representations and the "Whose" system
type: Dataset
description: Mirroring has been almost exclusively analysed in motor terms with no reference to the body that carries the action. According to the standard view, one activates motor representations upon seeing other people moving. However, one does not only see movements, one also sees another individual's body. The following questions then arise. To what extent does one recruit body representations in social context? And does it imply that body representations are shared between self and others? This latter question is all the more legitimate since recent evidence indicates the existence of shared cortical networks for bodily sensations, including pain (e.g., Singer et al., 2004) and touch (e.g., Keysers et al., 2004; Blakemore et al., 2005). But if body representations are shared, then it seems that their activation cannot suffice to discriminate between one's body and other people's bodies. Does one then need a "Whose" system to recognize one's body as one's own, in the same way that Jeannerod argued that one needs a "Who" system to recognize one's actions as one's own?
landing page: 0028-3932
keyword: infoeu-reposemanticsarticle
keyword: journal-articles
keyword: sccocogdynamicscognitive-sciencedomainsccocogdynamics
issued: 2026-05-11T13:01:11.696382
modified: 2026-05-11T13:01:11.696387
language: en
contact point: Organization
  fn: CCSD

test_moissonnage_selune
type: Agent

Shared body representations and the "Whose" system
type: Distribution
format: HTML
access URL: https://hal.science/ijn_00812272
issued: 2026-05-11T13:01:11.698362
modified: 2026-05-11T13:01:11.690128