Nonconceptual representations for action and the limits of intentional control
type: Dataset
description: In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relationships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements,thus allowing them to come under intentional control. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy these nonconceptual representations enjoy, and the specific temporal constraints stemming from their role in motor control, set limits on intentional control over action execution.
issued: 2026-05-15T03:49:36.163112
language: en
modified: 2026-05-15T03:49:36.163132
contact point: Organization
  fn: CCSD
keyword: action
keyword: infoeu-reposemanticsarticle
keyword: intentional-control
keyword: journal-articles
keyword: motor-control
keyword: motor-representation
keyword: nonconceptual-content
keyword: shsphilactionhumanities-and-social-sciencesphilosophydomainshsphilaction
keyword: shsphilmindhumanities-and-social-sciencesphilosophydomainshsphilmind
landing page: 0147-829X

Nonconceptual representations for action and the limits of intentional control
type: Distribution
format: HTML
issued: 2026-05-15T03:49:36.242535
modified: 2026-05-15T03:49:36.137256
access URL: https://hal.science/ijn_00778373

test_moissonnage_selune
type: Agent