Too much ado about belief
type: Dataset
description: Three commitments guide Dennett's approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls 'heterophenomenology.' Third, a 'doxological' commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject's beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/ appearance distinction for consciousness. We investigate how Dennett's third doxological commitment relates to his first two commitments and whether its acceptance should be seen as a mere logical consequence of acceptance of the first two. We will argue that this is not the case, that Dennett's doxological commitment is in need of independent motivation, and that this independent motivation is not forthcoming
landing page: 1568-7759
keyword: belief
keyword: consciousness
keyword: doxological-commitment
keyword: heterophenomenology
keyword: infoeu-reposemanticsarticle
keyword: journal-articles
keyword: monism
keyword: shsphilmindhumanities-and-social-sciencesphilosophydomainshsphilmind
issued: 2026-05-15T04:34:14.397127
modified: 2026-05-15T04:34:14.397135
language: en
contact point: Organization
  fn: CCSD

test_moissonnage_selune
type: Agent

Too much ado about belief
type: Distribution
format: HTML
access URL: https://hal.science/ijn_00777972
issued: 2026-05-15T04:34:14.401201
modified: 2026-05-15T04:34:14.359463