Strategic Interactions in Environmental Regulation Enforcement: Evidence from Chinese Provinces
type: Dataset
description: This paper studies whether Chinese provinces set strategically their environmental stringency when faced with interprovincial competition for mobile capital. Using Chinese provincial data and spatial panel econometric models, we find that Chinese provinces do engage in this kind of strategic interaction, particularly among those with similar industrial structure. Furthermore, we haven't found evidence of asymmetric responsiveness suggested by the race to the bottom theory. Finally, the one-sided fiscal decentralization is likely to strengthen the strategic behavior. These empirical results call for a skeptical attitude towards China's decentralization of environment policy implementation as well as its fiscal arrangements.
issued: 2026-05-27T18:43:19.497537
language: en
modified: 2026-05-27T18:43:19.497542
contact point: Organization
  fn: CCSD
keyword: china
keyword: infoeu-reposemanticspreprint
keyword: jel-c---mathematical-and-quantitative-methodscc2---single-equation-models--single-variables
keyword: jel-h---public-economicshh7---state-and-local-government--intergovernmental-relations
keyword: jel-q---agricultural-and-natural-resource-economics--environmental-and-ecological-economicsqq5--
keyword: jel-r---urban-rural-regional-real-estate-and-transportation-economicsrr5---regional-governmen
keyword: pollution
keyword: preprints-working-papers-
keyword: shsecohumanities-and-social-scienceseconomics-and-finance
keyword: spatial-panel
keyword: strategic-interaction
landing page: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00672449

Strategic Interactions in Environmental Regulation Enforcement: Evidence from Chinese Provinces
type: Distribution
format: HTML
issued: 2026-05-27T18:43:19.551834
modified: 2026-05-27T18:43:19.472560
access URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00672449

test_moissonnage_selune
type: Agent