Joint Audit, Game Theory, and Impairment-Testing Disclosures
type: Dataset
description: We examine the consequences on impairment testing disclosures of auditor-pair choice made by French listed companies where two (joint) auditors are required by law. Managers are likely to manipulate impairment-testing disclosures since it relies on unverifiable fair value estimates (e.g., goodwill). From a simple game theory model, we demonstrate that a Big-4 auditor paired with a non-Big 4 auditor increase auditors' incentives to force firms to disclose more because Big 4 auditor fully bears reputation costs. Using a disclosure score for firms composing the French SBF 120 index from 2006 to 2009, we provide evidence that combination of Big 4 / non-Big 4 auditors generate higher impairment-related disclosures levels whereas the other combinations, i.e. two Big 4 or two non-Big 4, tend to decrease the level of impairment-related disclosures. These empirical results are consistent with our model predictions and robust to various controls variables (e.g., size, risk, year and firm fixed effects).
landing page: Université Paris-Dauphine
keyword: conference-papers
keyword: disclosures
keyword: game-theory
keyword: ias-36
keyword: impairment-test
keyword: infoeu-reposemanticsconferenceobject
keyword: joint-audit
keyword: prisoners-dilemma
keyword: shsgestionhumanities-and-social-sciencesbusiness-administration
issued: 2026-05-24T09:15:04.435887
modified: 2026-05-24T09:15:04.435893
language: en
contact point: Organization
  fn: CCSD

test_moissonnage_selune
type: Agent

Joint Audit, Game Theory, and Impairment-Testing Disclosures
type: Distribution
format: HTML
access URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00671613
issued: 2026-05-24T09:15:04.513469
modified: 2026-05-24T09:15:04.401711