test_moissonnage_selune
type: Agent

The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
type: Dataset
contact point: Organization
  fn: CCSD
keyword: substitutes
keyword: journal-articles
keyword: assignment
keyword: shsecohumanities-and-social-scienceseconomics-and-finance
keyword: infoeu-reposemanticsarticle
keyword: vickrey--clarke-groves-mechanism
keyword: coalition-formation
keyword: manipulability
keyword: incremental-value
landing page: 0899-8256
description: In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared. The predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form, as the collection of pairs of buyer-seller in an assignment game. The incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection. Furthermore the relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn.
issued: 2026-05-28T09:51:56.396862
language: en
modified: 2026-05-28T09:51:56.396871

The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
type: Distribution
access URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00670881
format: HTML
issued: 2026-05-28T09:51:56.406423
modified: 2026-05-28T09:51:56.371187