Production externalities: internalization by voting
type: Dataset
description: We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance.
issued: 2026-05-05T16:58:49.465735
language: en
modified: 2026-05-05T16:58:49.465739
contact point: Organization
  fn: CCSD
keyword: general-equilibrium
keyword: infoeu-reposemanticspreprint
keyword: jel-d---microeconomicsdd7---analysis-of-collective-decision-makingdd7d72---political-processes
keyword: majority-voting
keyword: preprints-working-papers-
keyword: production-externalities
keyword: shareholder-governance-vs-stakeholder-democracy
keyword: shsecohumanities-and-social-scienceseconomics-and-finance
keyword: social-choice
landing page: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-00972983

Production externalities: internalization by voting
type: Distribution
format: HTML
issued: 2026-05-05T16:58:49.468169
modified: 2026-05-05T16:58:49.453866
access URL: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-00972983

test_moissonnage_selune
type: Agent