@prefix dcat: <http://www.w3.org/ns/dcat#> .
@prefix dct: <http://purl.org/dc/terms/> .
@prefix foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/> .
@prefix vcard: <http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#> .
@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .

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              This paper develops a simple model showing how banks can increase the access to finance of small, risky firms by mitigating coordination problems among investors. If investors observe a biased signal about the true implementation cost of real sector projects, the model can be solved for a switching equilibrium in the classical global games approach. We show that the socially optimal interest rate that maximizes the probability of success of the firm is higher than the risk-free rate. Yet if banks maximize investors' expected return, they would choose an interest higher than the socially optimal one. This gives rise to a form of credit rationing, which stems from the funding constraints of the banks.
            """ ;
    dct:identifier "hal-00952641" ;
    dct:issued "2026-05-06T05:31:41.079368"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:language "en" ;
    dct:modified "2026-05-06T05:31:41.079373"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:publisher <https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/organization/cce9db95-46d9-4dc2-84b6-764215d0a002> ;
    dct:title "Optimal Return in a Model of Bank Small-business Financing" ;
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    dcat:keyword "bank-finance",
        "global-games",
        "infoeu-reposemanticspreprint",
        "jel-c---mathematical-and-quantitative-methodscc7---game-theory-and-bargaining-theorycc7c72---n",
        "jel-d---microeconomicsdd8---information-knowledge-and-uncertaintydd8d82---asymmetric-and-pri",
        "jel-g---financial-economicsgg2---financial-institutions-and-servicesgg2g21---banks--depositor",
        "jel-g---financial-economicsgg3---corporate-finance-and-governancegg3g32---financing-policy--f",
        "optimal-return",
        "optimal-return-rium",
        "preprints-working-papers-",
        "shsecohumanities-and-social-scienceseconomics-and-finance",
        "small-business",
        "switching-equilibrium" ;
    dcat:landingPage <https://essec.hal.science/hal-00952641> .

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    dct:issued "2026-05-06T05:31:41.083670"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:modified "2026-05-06T05:31:41.063780"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:title "Optimal Return in a Model of Bank Small-business Financing" ;
    dcat:accessURL <https://essec.hal.science/hal-00952641> .

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