@prefix dcat: <http://www.w3.org/ns/dcat#> .
@prefix dct: <http://purl.org/dc/terms/> .
@prefix foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/> .
@prefix vcard: <http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#> .
@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .

<https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/dataset/oai-hal-hal-00690409v1> a dcat:Dataset ;
    dct:description """
              Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy within a variant of the ultimatum game. The first player gets an endowment, and the second player can impose a tax on it. The former can reject the allocation submitted by the tax-setter. A third party is then allowed to levy its own tax, and its intake is private information to the tax-setter. In a frameless experiment, 65% of the subjects in the tax-setter role overstate the tax levied by the third party in order to manipulate taxpayer's expectations and submit less advantageous offers; on average, for every additional currency unit of lie, measured by the gap between the claimed and the actual tax, they would reduce their offer by 0.43 currency units.
            """ ;
    dct:identifier "hal-00690409" ;
    dct:issued "2026-05-21T01:02:01.310996"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:language "en" ;
    dct:modified "2026-05-21T01:02:01.311002"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:publisher <https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/organization/cce9db95-46d9-4dc2-84b6-764215d0a002> ;
    dct:title "The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information" ;
    dcat:contactPoint [ a vcard:Organization ;
            vcard:fn "CCSD" ] ;
    dcat:distribution <https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/dataset/oai-hal-hal-00690409v1/resource/414181bb-cfd3-43cc-9be8-2fecba82ee38> ;
    dcat:keyword "asymmetric-information",
        "deception",
        "infoeu-reposemanticspreprint",
        "jel-c---mathematical-and-quantitative-methods",
        "jel-c---mathematical-and-quantitative-methodscc9---design-of-experimentscc9c91---laboratory-i",
        "jel-d---microeconomicsdd8---information-knowledge-and-uncertaintydd8d82---asymmetric-and-pri",
        "jel-d---microeconomicsdd8---information-knowledge-and-uncertaintydd8d83---search--learning",
        "lies",
        "preprints-working-papers-",
        "shsecohumanities-and-social-scienceseconomics-and-finance",
        "taxation",
        "ultimatum-game" ;
    dcat:landingPage <https://essec.hal.science/hal-00690409> .

<https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/dataset/oai-hal-hal-00690409v1/resource/414181bb-cfd3-43cc-9be8-2fecba82ee38> a dcat:Distribution ;
    dct:format "HTML" ;
    dct:issued "2026-05-21T01:02:01.397236"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:modified "2026-05-21T01:02:01.275542"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:title "The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information" ;
    dcat:accessURL <https://essec.hal.science/hal-00690409> .

<https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/organization/cce9db95-46d9-4dc2-84b6-764215d0a002> a foaf:Agent ;
    foaf:name "test_moissonnage_selune" .

<https://essec.hal.science/hal-00690409> a foaf:Document .