@prefix dcat: <http://www.w3.org/ns/dcat#> .
@prefix dct: <http://purl.org/dc/terms/> .
@prefix foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/> .
@prefix vcard: <http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#> .
@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .

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    dct:description """
              This paper brings experimental evidence on investors' behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment context. Results confirm the insidious nature of the illiquidity risk: as long as a first illiquidity default does not occur, investors do not seem able to fully internalize it. After several defaults, agents manage to coordinate on a default probability above which they refuse to participate to the project. This default probability is lower than the default probability of the first illiquidity default.
            """ ;
    dct:identifier "hal-00607867" ;
    dct:issued "2026-05-14T06:02:35.913772"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:language "en" ;
    dct:modified "2026-05-14T06:02:35.913778"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:publisher <https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/organization/cce9db95-46d9-4dc2-84b6-764215d0a002> ;
    dct:title "Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk" ;
    dcat:contactPoint [ a vcard:Organization ;
            vcard:fn "CCSD" ] ;
    dcat:distribution <https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/dataset/oai-hal-hal-00607867v2/resource/36ba6dea-b3fd-4e21-8239-918867abfa0f> ;
    dcat:keyword "coordination-game",
        "experimental-economics",
        "illiquidity-risk",
        "infoeu-reposemanticspreprint",
        "jel-c---mathematical-and-quantitative-methodscc7---game-theory-and-bargaining-theorycc7c72---n",
        "jel-c---mathematical-and-quantitative-methodscc9---design-of-experimentscc9c92---laboratory-g",
        "jel-d---microeconomicsdd8---information-knowledge-and-uncertaintydd8d81---criteria-for-decis",
        "jel-g---financial-economicsgg2---financial-institutions-and-servicesgg2g20---general",
        "preprints-working-papers-",
        "shsdroithumanities-and-social-scienceslaw",
        "shsecohumanities-and-social-scienceseconomics-and-finance",
        "threshold-strategy" ;
    dcat:landingPage <https://essec.hal.science/hal-00607867> .

<https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/dataset/oai-hal-hal-00607867v2/resource/36ba6dea-b3fd-4e21-8239-918867abfa0f> a dcat:Distribution ;
    dct:format "HTML" ;
    dct:issued "2026-05-14T06:02:35.916657"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:modified "2026-05-14T06:02:35.889478"^^xsd:dateTime ;
    dct:title "Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk" ;
    dcat:accessURL <https://essec.hal.science/hal-00607867> .

<https://rec.harvest-normandie.data4citizen.com/organization/cce9db95-46d9-4dc2-84b6-764215d0a002> a foaf:Agent ;
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<https://essec.hal.science/hal-00607867> a foaf:Document .