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Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard
International audience -
Correlation and relative performance evaluation
International audience -
Does PLS financing solve asymmetric information problems?
International audience -
Bank Competition, Crisis and Risk Taking : Evidence from Emerging Markets in ...
International audience -
Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision: Combining Random Audits and Continuous I...
Early regulator interventions into problem banks is one of the key suggestions of Basel II. However, no guidance is given on their design. To fill this gap, we outline... -
Tailoring Bank Capital Regulation for Tail Risk
The experience of the 2007-09 financial crisis has showed that the bank capital regulation in place was inadequate to deal with "manufacturing" tail risk in the... -
Masters of the universe: How power and accountability influence self-serving ...
International audience -
Monetary Regimes and EU Accession: Comparing Bulgaria and Romania
International audience -
Optimal Monetary Provisions in Plural Form Franchise Systems; A Theoretical M...
Empirical studies show that most franchise chains use dual distribution - or a plural form franchise system - characterized by the coexistence of franchised units and... -
Insurance and Optimal Growth
The aim of this paper is to propose a theoretical connection between insurance and economic growth. We develop a simple model to insert microeconomically founded... -
Linear Prices Equilibria and Nonexclusive Insurance Market
We consider a competitive insurance market in which agents can privately enter into multicontractual insurance relationships and undertake hidden actions. We study the... -
Heterogeneous Banking Efficiency : Allocative Distortions and Lending Fluctua...
This paper is a first attempt to connect the heterogeneity in bank efficiency with lending fluctuations and allocation efficiency: there is a trade-off between the two... -
Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
We characterize the set of second-best optimal "menus" of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard...
