-
Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information
International audience -
Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective
International audience -
Extensions of the Cav(u) theorem for repeated games with one-sided information
This work is devoted to extend several asymptotic results concerning repeated games with incomplete information on one side. The model we consider is a generalization... -
Covariance control problems over martingales with fixed terminal distribution...
International audience -
Optimal use of communication resources
We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all... -
p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
In this paper, we use p-best response sets--a set-valued extension of p-dominance--in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to... -
Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations
This paper studies the effects of analogy-based expectations in static two-player games of incomplete information. Players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the... -
Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to... -
Robust equilibria under non-common priors
This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information, where players are allowed to have heterogeneous priors. An equilibrium... -
Games with incomplete information in continuous time and for continuous types.
International audience -
Flow Control as Stochastic Optimal Control Problem with Incomplete Information
The nonlinear stochastic control problem related with flow control is considered. The state of the link is described by controlled hidden Markov process while the loss... -
Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information
We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The... -
Personality Aspects and Fuzzy Logic for Bilateral Negotiation Behaviors with ...
International audience -
"Time and Personality Based Behaviors To Control the Negotiation Process with...
International audience -
The value of Markov Chain Games with incomplete information on both sides.
We consider zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, where the states privately observed by each player follow independent Markov chains. It...
