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Breaking Collusion in Auctions Through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emis...
International audience -
Network bandwidth allocation with end-to-end QoS constraints and revenue shar...
International audience -
Auction-based strategies for the open-system patrolling task
International audience -
Working as a team: using social criteria in the timed patrolling problem
International audience -
Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-...
We find an error in [H. Cai, J. Riley, L. Ye, Reserve price signaling, J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]. The existence of the separating signaling equilibrium... -
Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393-407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller's minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show... -
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle
The analysis of second price auctions with externalities is utterly modified if the seller is unable to commit not to participate in the mechanism. For the General... -
The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
We consider standard auction models when bidders' identities are not-or are only partially-observed by the econometrician. We first adapt the definition of... -
Hard assets: The returns on rare diamonds and gems
International audience -
Equity and Cash in Intercorporate Asset Sales: Theory and Evidence
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 859/2006 -
Optimal Extortion and Political Risk Insurance
We study the problem faced by firms that invest in a foreign country characterized by weak governance. Our focus is on extortion relying on the threat of expropriation... -
Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information
International audience -
Auctions and shareholdings
International audience -
Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
International audience -
Privatisation des sociétés d'autoroute et marché aval
International audience -
The winner's curse: why is the cost of sports mega-events so often underestim...
Auction theory, when the bidders do not know the value of what is auctionned, is used to explain how the Olympic Games are allocated to competing bidding cities. It is... -
Buying Beauty: On Prices and Returns in the Art Market
International audience -
Brandt's Fully Private Auction Protocol Revisited
International audience -
Market Clearing Price and Equilibria of the Progressive Second Price Mechanism
International audience -
On the Existence of Approximated Equilibria and Sharing-Rule Equilibria in Di...
New relaxations of the Nash equilibrium concept are shown to exist in any strategic game with discontinuous payoff functions. The new concepts are used (1) to show the...
